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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

I

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

BYRON SCHULTZ,

(

Case No.

12751

Defendant-Appellant. '

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
An appeal from the conviction of a charge of illegal
sale of narcotics.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a jury verdict against appellant, he was sentenced to a term of not less than five years in the Utah
St.ate Prison, where he is presently serving the sentence
of the Court.
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NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks affirmation of the judgment of the
lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent, State of Utah will basically accept
appellant's Statement of Facts, but will supplement the
statement in rebuttal to the points of argwnent raised
by the appellant where necessary for clarification.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
NO EV IDE N CE OF ENTRAPMENT EXISTED WARRANTING REVERSAL.
The appellant contends that his conviction for the
offense should be set aside because his commission of the
crime was the result of entrapment. The evidence bearing on the issue of entrapment shows that some time
prior to the commission of the crime, the appellant purportedly sold Officer Roche some suspected psyclocybin
capsules (a hallucinogenic similar to LSD) on May 2,
1971 (T. 156-7). However, an analysis of the capsules
turned out negative (T. 158). On May 19, 1971, Officer
Roche went to the Ogden City Park with a Mr. Gary
Spangler. They were to meet with an individual to make
a purchase of heroin (T. 131). Mr. Spangler went into
the park to find that individual but he was not there.
The appellant testified concerning his initial contact with
Mr. Spangler (T. 177):
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A. Gary Spangler, I believe. I was at the
park talking to my friends.

Q. What happened when you were approached? What was said?
A. This certain Gary Spangler wanted to
know where he could purchase some heroin and
he looked to me as if he were a heroin addict. So
I checked around. I was going to do him a favor.
I checked around and found Terry Ebaugh and
asked him if Mr. Gary Spangler could purchase
some heroin from him. Then I made the transaction with the money, because Ebaugh was kind of
afraid.

Appellant went over to the car where Officer Roche
was waiting. Officer Roche testified at trial concerning
his initial contact with the appellant (T. 132-33).
Q. When you say an individual walked up
to the car, did he say anything to you?
A. Yes, he said, I don't know verbatim exactly the words, but he stated he could score me,
meaning sell me some heroin.
Q. Did he use the word heroin?
A. No, it is a slang term called the smack.
Q. What did you then do?
A. I agreed. He said that he needed the
money then, twenty. I gave him twenty dollars.
I indicated that I wanted two hips of heroin,
dime bags. Meaning ten dollars apiece.

Q.

Did he take the money?

A. Yes, he took the money.
Q. What did he do then?
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A. He said he would be back in about twenty
minutes. He had to go down to an individual's
home by the name of Terry Ebaugh to get the
suspected heroin.
Q.

Did you observe him walk away?

A.

Yes, he walked away.

Q.

Did he leave your sight?

A. For about a minute, then he returned with
the suspected heroin.
Q.

What did he do with it?

A. He gave the two packets to me.
Q. Were there any further conversations between you?

A. He stated that he wanted some and that
he wanted me to go with him to hit-up some place.
THE COURT: I can't hear you.
A. He wanted some of the heroin, suspected
heroin. He wanted to go up to my place or some
other place to hit-up on it, meaning inject it, or
whatever he wanted to take. I wasn't acquainted
with the way he took it.
Q.

Did you go with him?

A. No, I told him that it wasn't for me.
Meaning, you know, I could get away from him
without him pestering me more for heroin. You
know.
The substance of the testimony was that appellant
had been engaged in this type of activity. Appellant testified he occasionally helped persons obtain drugs (T. 182).
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Appellant further testified that no pressure at all had
been put on him by Officer Roche.
The above testimony, it is submitted, conclusively
shows that no entrapment was committed, and that the
trial court gratuitously allowed an instruction on the matter where none was warranted.
In Salt Lake City v. Robinson, 40 Utah 448, 125 P.
657 (1912), the Supreme Court, although not characterizing the defense as one of "entrapment," set down a
similar substantive test as to when a conviction was to
be vitiated because of police inducement. The court said:
"No doubt if public offices have induced or
procured a defendant to commit a burglary or
larceny or other offense which he did not intend
to commit nor would have committed except for
the inducement of such officer, public policy will
not justify a conviction for an offense committed
under such circumstances."
The rule was followed in State v. McComish, 59 Utah
58, 201 P. 637 (1921), and found not applicable to the
facts of State v. Franco, 76 Utah 202, 289 P. 100 (1930).
Thus, it can be said that entrapment is a recognized doctrine in Utah.' The rule is the same as that applied in
1

Entrapment is not recognized in all jurisdictions. Thus, New York
does not recognize it, People v. Schacher, 48 N. Y. S. 2d 371 (1944),
nor Tennessee, Goins v. State, 192 Tenn. 32, 237 S. W. 2d 8 (1950).
Florida has partially abolished it by statute, 22 Fla. Stat. Ann. Sec.
838.11 (1957). It is questionable as to whether several other common law jurisdictions approve of the American rule as such. Browning v. J. W. H. Watson, 1 WLR 1172, 2 All E. R. 775 (1953 England); Smith v. O'Donovan, 28 NZLR 94 (1908 New Zealand);
Marsh v. Johnston, (1959) Crim. L. R. 444 (Scotland); Contra:
R. v. Nothout, (1912), CPD 1037 (South AF).
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other cases. In Sherman v. United States, 356 U. S. 369
(1958), the United States Supreme Court stated:
"However, the fact that government agents
'merely afford opportunities or facilities for the
commission of the offense' does not constitute entrapment. Entrapment occurs only when the criminal conduct was the product of the creative activity of law enforcement officials."
The Nevada Supreme Court in In re Wright, 68 Nev.
324, 232 P. 2d 398 (1951), defined entrapment as follows:
"Entrapment is the seduction or improper inducement to commit a crime for the purpose of
instituting a criminal prosecution, but if a person
in good faith and for the purpose of detecting or
discovering a crime or offense furnishes the opportunity for the commission thereof by one who has
the requisite criminal intent it is not entrapment."
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has defined the concept of entrapment in Crosbie v. State, 330
P. 2d 602 (1958 Okla. Cr.), as follows:
"Entrapment is the planning of an offense by
an officer, or someone acting under his direction,
and his procurement by improper inducement of
its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery of the officer."
Thus, there appear to be two essential elements to the
defense of entrapment: ( 1) the unlawful inducement,
and (2) the commission of the crime as the direct result
of the trickery and not the result of a willingness or pre-
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conceived criminal intent. United States v. Sherman, 200
F. 2d 880 (1952). In determining whether the police inducement provided the unlawful intent, Justice Learned
Hand said in United States v. Sherman, 200 F. 2d 880,
882:
"[I]t is a valid reply to the defense, if the
prosecution can satisfy the jury that the accused
was ready and willing to commit the offense
charged, whenever the opportunity offered."

It is also the generally accepted rule in the majority
of jurisdictions that evidence of previous convictions and
misconduct of the same may be considered in determining
the "ready compliance" or "criminal design" of the defendant. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435, 451
(1932); 49 Jnl. Crim. & Pol. Sci., 447, 450.
This Court in State v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d 148, 369
P. 2d 494 (1962), adopted this rule on entrapment when
it stated:
"When that issue is present, the question is
whether the crime is the product of defendant's
own intention and desire, or is the product of some
incitement or inducement by the peace officer. If
the crime was in fact so instigated or induced by
what the officer did that the latter's conduct was
the generating cause which produced the crime,
and without which it would not have been committed, the defendant should not be convicted.
On the other hand, if the defendant's attitude of
mind was such that he desired and intended to
commit the crime, the mere fact that an officer
or someone else afforded him the opportunity to
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commit it would not constitute entrapment which
would be a defense to its commission...." 369 P.
2d at 496.
In State v. Perkins, 19 Utah 2d 421, 432 P. 2d 50
(1967), this Court affirmed the entrapment rule and
added:
"The evidence regarding prior contacts between the agent and the defendant was competent
to rebut the claim of entrapment. It was offered
to enable the jury to determine whether the defendant was an innocent person whose mind was
being influenced by suggestions of the agent or
whether he had a disposition to deal in narcotics
when the proper situation arose." 432 P. 2d at 52.
A federal district court decided a case similar to the
one at bar. In United States v. Lee Kow, 148 F. Supp.
180 (E. D. Penn. 1957), a government agent was looking
for a narcotic's suspect. While doing so he happened
upon the defendant whom he did not know, approached
him and broached the subject of narcotics. The agent
asked the defendant to sell him narcotics and after negotiations and maneuvers the defendant did so. The court
held that there was no entrapment. 148 F. Supp. at 181.
In another case, Fletcher v. United States, 295 F. 2d
179 (D. C. Cir. 1961), the Court held there was no entrapment where a police informer had conversation with
the defendant and a third person in sight of a police officer, and the informer gave the third person money, which
had been supplied by the police officer, and the third person gave the money to the defendant who in turn gave

the narcotics to the third person who gave them to the
informer.
By applying the above noted rules and case law to
the present case, it is clear that the appellant was not
entrapped. Both the testimony of Officer Roche and the
appellant show that he was not pressured or induced to
commit the crime but an opportunity existed and appellant procured the narcotics because he wanted to.
The issue of entrapment is one for the jury, United
States v. Markham, 191 F. 2d 936 (1951), unless as a
matter of law it appears that entrapment was present.
United States v. Sherman, 356 U. S. 369 (1958). The
jury could well have believed that the criminal conduct
originated with the appellant; hence, sufficient evidence
to sustain the conviction in spite of the entrapment plea
exists, and the jury's decision must be upheld. Berchtold
v. State, 11 Utah 208, 357 P. 2d 183 (1960). Even were
the appellant induced in some way, the second element
for the defense of entrapment is expressly negatived by
appellant's ready compliance to commit the crime. For
this reason, the trial court's instruction placing the defense in issue for the jury was a mere gratuity, as the
issue was not raised as a matter of law. The claim of entrapment is not well taken.

POINT II.
APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS AN
AGENT OF OFFICER ROCHE IS NOT AP-
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PLICABLE IN THIS CASE UNDER UTAH
LAW.
The appellant relies upon an agency theory to absolve his guilt of committing a crime in violation of Utah
law. Appellant was charged with and convicted of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-13a-44 (8) (Repl. Vol. 1969), which states:
"(8) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, every person who transports, imports into
this state, sells, furnishes, administers, gives away
or offers to transport, import into this state, sell,
furnish, administer, give away or attempts to import into this state or transport any narcotic other
than marijuana except upon the written prescription of a licensed physician, dentist, practitioner,
or veterinarian shall be punished by imprisonment
in the state prison from five years to Zife and shall
not be eligible for release upon completion of sentence or on parole or on any other basis until he
has served not less than three years in prison."
(Emphasis added.)
Utah Code Ann. § 58-13a-1 (10) (Repl. Vol. 1969)
defines sale or sell as follows:
"(10) 'Sale' or 'sell' includes barter, exchange,
gift, transfer, prescribe, give away, or offer thereof,
and each such transaction made by any person,
whether as a principal, proprietor, agent, servant
or employee." (Emphasis added.)
Case law upon the agency theory seems to be split.
Appellant presents some authority for his position. However, there is alternative precedent that embodies the
meaning the legislature intended and comprehended with-
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in the prohibitions of our narcotic drug laws. There are
other states with statutes exactly or similarly worded t.o
that of Utah.
The Supreme Court of Illinois in People v. Shannon,
15 Ill. 2d 494, 155 N. E. 2d 579 (1959), decided a case
wherein an undercover agent asked the defendant where
he could get some narcotics. The defendant took the
agent to a tavern where the agent gave the defendant
the money for the narcotics. The defendant procured the
narcotics from a third party and in turn gave the narcotics
t.o the undercover agent. The court found the defendant
guilty of a "sale."
State v. Weissman, 73 N. J. Super. 274, 179 A. 2d
748 ( 1962) , a case with similar facts, found the defendant
guilty and cited from Shannon as precedent:

"We interpret the meaning of the word 'sale,'
as defined by the act, t.o be much broader in scope
than that usually given t.o it in other branches of
the law. Admittedly, the defendant t.ook the role
of at least an agent, and the act specifically declares an agent in a narcotics transaction t.o be a
seller. We are of the opinion that the definition
shows a legislative intent that the act of a person
whether as agent, either for the seller or the purchaser, or as a go-between, in such a transaction
constitutes a sale."
This case was cited approvingly by the same court in
People v. Glass, 16 Ill. 2d 595, 158 N. E. 2d 639 (Sup. Ct.
1959), and the identical judicial concept was restated in
People v. Aldridge, 19 Ill. 2d 176, 166 N. E. 2d 563, 565
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(Sup. Ct. 1960), cert. denied 364 U. S. 873, 81 S. Ct. 117,
5 L. Ed. 2d 95 ( 1960) . The court in this last decision
explicated its previous interpretation by saying:
"Under the broad reach of this definition it is
not necessary to trace title to the drug with technical nicety in order to establish an unlawful sale.
Nor does one who is proved to have participated
in some capacity forbidden by the statute escape
guilt because the proof does not fix with certainty
the particular capacity in which he acted. Proof
that a person participated in a transaction as principal, agent, servant, or employee is sufficient."
179 A. 2d at 751-2.
Other jurisdictions that have taken this same view
with cases involving identical or similar facts include
McKay v. State, 489 P. 2d 145 (Alaska 1971); Higby v.
State, 485 P. 2d 380 (Wyoming 1971); People v. Miller,
31 Mich. App. 121, 187 N. W. 2d 569 (1971); State v.
Anderson, 172 N. W. 2d 597 (North Dakota 1969).
The cases, Adams v. United States, 220 F. 2d 297
(5th Cir. 1955) and United States v. Prince, 264 F. 2d
850 (3d Cir. 1959), cited by appellant as precedent were
decided in accordance with the Narcotic Drugs Impact
and Export Act, 21 U.S. C. § 174. This Act was repealed
by Pub. L. 91-513, Title III, § 1101 (a) (4), Oct. 27, 1970,
84 Stat. 1291. This statute had a narrow application and
did not envision the sweeping reforms enacted in statutes
such as Utah Code Ann. § 58-13a-1. Therefore, cases
based upon the federal law or which follow that interpretation are not precedent that would comport with the
meaning and intent of Utah statutory law.
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There is no question that the primary purpose of
passing the Drug Act was to suppress illegal narcotics
traffic. The statute was passed as an all out offensive
to combat the drug evil by eliminating sources of supply.
Every step in the scheme of illegal distribution was made
a violation of the statute.
Therefore, appellant's contentions are erroneous, no
instruction was necessary, and his conviction was consistent with the laws of Utah.
CONCLUSION
There is no evidence to substantiate appellant's claim
of entrapment or improper jury instructions on the matter. Appellant's claim that he is an agent of Officer Roche
is not applicable under Utah law. Therefore, there is no
reason why the lower court's verdict should not be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
WILLIAM T. EVANS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

